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LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW - NORTH DAKOTA'S PRODUCT LIABILITY
ACT STATUTE OF REPOSE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
127
During the summer of 1983, Williams County loaned a multi
ton earth packer, manufactured by Ingram Manufacturing
Company (Ingram), to the city of Williston, North Dakota.1 Todd
Hefta, a city employee, was assigned with a fellow employee to
operate the earth packer. 2 On August 24, 1983, as the fellow
employee climbed into the operator's seat of the packer, Hefta
walked behind the packer to get a drink of water from a cooler
placed on the back of the machine. 3 The operator touched the
starter button and the earth packer "jumped backwards." ' 4 The
machine ran over Hefta and he died as a result of the accident. 5
Bonny Hanson, Todd Hefta's mother, filed a wrongful death
action against Williams County and Ingram. 6 In the complaint
Hanson alleged negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability
in tort. 7 Ingram moved for summary judgment on the basis of
1. See Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 320 (N.D. 1986). Ingram Manufacturing
Company manufactured the earth packer on November 13, 1963. Id. In April 1964 it was sold to
Krider Equipment Company of Fargo, which later sold it to the State of North Dakota. Id. Williams
County bought the packer from the state onJuly 9, 1980. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. The earth packer operator allegedly checked the clutch to make sure it was out of gear
before he touched the starter button. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Hanson filed the wrongful death action pursuant to chapter 32-21 of the North Dakota
Century Code. Id. Section 32-21-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default,
and the act, neglect, or default is such as would have entitled the party injured, if
death had not ensued, to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof,
then and in every such case the person who, or the corporation or company which,
would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured or of the tortfeasor, and
although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law
to felony.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 32-21-01 (Supp. 1983).
7. 389 N.W.2d at 320. The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that Hanson's claims
based upon fraud, misrepresentation, and violations of relevant OSHA regulations were no longer
material to the case. Id. at 320 n. 1.
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subsection 28-01.1-02(1) of the North Dakota Century Code.
8
Subsection 28-01.1-02(1) provides the applicable statute of repose
for cases brought pursuant to North Dakota's Product Liability
Act, and if applied, would have terminated Hanson's claim. 9 The
district court granted Ingram's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed Hanson's claim against Ingram. 10 The North Dakota
Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that North
Dakota's Product Liability Act's statute of repose violated the
equal protection provision of the North Dakota Constitution."1
Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986).
In the late 1970's, many states enacted product liability
legislation in response to a perceived crisis in the product liability
field. 12 A number of manufacturers, retailers, and distributors
-8. Id. at 320. T-he North Dakota-Produet Liability Act's statute of repose, codified in S28-01.1-
02 (1) of the North Dakota Century Code, provides:
I. There shall be no recovery of damages for personal injury, death, or damage to
property caused by a defective product, ... unless the injury, death, or damage
occurred within ten years of the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or
within eleven years of the date of manufacture of a product, where that action is
based upon, or arises out of, any of the following:
a. Breach of any implied warranties.
b. Defects in design, inspection, testing, or manufacture.
c. Failure to warn.
d. Failure to properly instruct in the use of a product.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-01.1-02(1) (Supp. 1985). For an extensive discussion of the statute's intended
purpose, see infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text. North Dakota's Product Liability Act's statute
of repose is labeled a statute of limitations. See N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28- 01.1-02 (Supp. 1985). This
label, however, has no legal effect. See id. S 1-02-12 (headnotes do not constitute part of a statute).
The time period in the statute begins to run from the date of the initial purchase, or date of
manufacture of the product. See id. § 28-01.1-02. Because the time period runs from the occurrence of
an event other than the injury, § 28-01.1-02 may bar a right of action before it accrues. See id. Thus,
the statute is, in effect, a statute of repose. See id.
9. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02(1) (Supp. 1985). For the text of 5 28-01.1-02(1) of the
North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 8. The parties agreed that Hanson's chances for recovery
against Ingram depended on the constitutionality of the statute of repose. Hanson v. Williams
County, Civ. No. 16489, mem. decision, at A-4 (June 24, 1985). The district court noted that some
courts have held similar statutes of repose unconstitutional, while other courts have determined that
similar statutes of repose are constitutional. Id. at A-2. The district court, however, refused to
substitute. its judgment for that of the legislature and reasoned that the issue was whether the
classification adopted seemed reasonable to the legislature. Id.
10. 389 N.W.2d at 320. The district court recognized that Williams County, the owner of the
earth packer, was in a different position than the manufacturer or retailer. See Civil No. 16489, at A-
4. The court noted that the owner's obligation likely arose under the law of bailments, and therefore
presented an entirely distinct basis of liability for Williams County. Id. Thus the court denied
summary.judgment on behalf of Williams County. Id.
11. 389 N.W.2d at 328. Article I, § 21 of the North Dakota Constitution guarantees equal
protection of the laws to every individual. See N.D. CoNsT. art. I, 5 21. Section 21 of article I
provides: "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered,
revoked or repealed by the legislative assembly; nor shall any citizen or class of citizens be granted
privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not be granted to all citizens." Id.
12. See Dowokin, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 602, 608 (1983)
(discussing state reaction to the product liability crisis); see also Herrmann, An Overview of State
Statutory Product Liability Law, 27 TRIAL LAWYER's GUIDE 1 (1983) (synopsis of each state's product
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urged the federal government to adopt legislation to relieve the
effects of the rising cost of product liability insurance.13 The
business community argued that an extraordinary increase in
product liability insurance rates, coupled with an unprecedented
increase in the number and size of product liability claims, was
causing product liability insurance to become unavailable and
unaffordable.1 4  In response to these concerns, the federal
government established the Federal Interagency Task Force to
study potential solutions to the problems associated with the
increase in product liability insurance rates.1
5
The Interagency Task Force suggested the drafting of federal
legislation to battle increased product liability insurance rates. 16
The Department of Commerce drafted the Uniform Product
Liability Act based on the findings of the Task Force and input
from various groups affected by the product liability problem."t
Although the Task Force assumed that most states would adopt the
Uniform Product Liability Act, no state has adopted the Act in its
liability laws); Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Terminating Right or Action For Product-
Caused Injury at Fixed Period After Manufacture, Sale, or Delivery, 25 A.L.R. 4th 641 (1983) (various state
product liability statutes of repose and an analysis of their validity).
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FED. INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL
REPORT 1-3 (1978) [hereinafter TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT].
14. See id. at 1-1. The increase in manufacturer liability was largely the result of the pro
consumer trend in product liability litigation. See Dowokin, supra note 12, at 602. This trend is
manifested by more frequent and larger jury awards. Id. at 603; see also Page & Stephens, Product
Liability Insurance "Crisis:" Causes, Nostrums and Cures, 13 CAP. U. L. REV. 387, 388-89 (1984)
(manifestations of the product liability "crisis" include quadrupling of product liability insurance
premiums, and a substantial increase in the number of product liability claims).
15. See TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 1-4. The United States Department of
Commerce performed an initial study of the problems associated with product liability litigation, and
suggested that there might be a product liability insurance problem that could place a great financial
burden on the insurance industry. Id. The report prompted the administration to form the
Interagency Task Force to study the problem in greater depth. Id.
The Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liability confirmed the existence of the
"crisis" and identified three principle causes of the product liability problem: (1) the liability rate
making procedures; (2) the manufacturing of unreasonably unsafe products; and (3) the uncertain
tort litigation system. Id. at 1-20. The Task Force identified numerous less significant causes of the
"crisis." Id. at 1-29. These additional causes include inflation, consumer and worker awareness,
increasing product complexity, and product misuse. Id.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, BRIEFING
REPORT, 1977, iv (1977). The Task Force indicated that federal legislation to battle increased
product liability insurance rates would avoid duplicate efforts by the states, facilitate interstate
commerce, and reduce the cost of insurance. Id. at v. On the basis of the Task Force's final report,.
the Department of Commerce drafted a report entitled "Draft Uniform Product Liability Law." 44
Fed. Reg. 2996 (1979); Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)
[hereinafter Uniform Product Liability Act]. The "Draft Law" contributed substantially to the
Department of Commerce's Model Uniform Product Liability Act. Id. at 62,716. See generally Coccia,
Uniform Product Liabiliy Legislation: A Proposed Federal Solution, 27 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 236 (1983) (a
discussion of the federal legislative reponse to the product liability crisis).
17. See Uniform Product Liability Act, supra note 16, at 62,714. A Draft Uniform Product
Liability Law was published for public comment prior to the final drafting of the Act. Id.; see 44 Fed.
Reg. 2996 (1979) (Draft Uniform Product Liability Law).
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entirety. 8 Many states, however, have enacted some type of
legislation designed to reduce product liability insurance rates. t9
Most of this legislation is loosely based on the Uniform Product
Liability Act. 0 The most frequent reform that states have adopted
is a provision that designates a specific time period in which a
person may bring an action against manufacturers.
21
In many states, legislatures have enacted a statute of
limitations coupled with a statute of repose. 22 A statute of
limitations bars a right of action unless it is filed within a specific
period of time after all the elements of a claim for relief accrue.23
The statutory time period, however, does not commence until the
injury is discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have been discovered. 24 On the other hand, a
statute of repose precludes a plaintiff's claim after the lapse of a
specific period of time, regardless of whether or not an injury has
occurred. 25 A statute of repose establishes an absolute time after the
purchase or manufacture of a product beyond which an injured
party cannot bring an action. 26 The effect of a statute of repose,
therefore, may be to preclude a right of action before the injury
occurs. 27
North Dakota adopted its Product Liability Act in 1979.28 The
18. Dowokin, supra note 12, at 608. The Department of Commerce urged nationwide adoption
of the Uniform Product Liability Act to provide uniformity and thus, a reduction in insurance rates.
Uniform Product Liability Act, supra note 16, at 62,714.
19. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 28-01.1 (Supp. 1985) (product liability act). See generally
Dowokin, supra note 12, at 608.
20. Compare, FLA. STAT. ANN. S 95.031(2) (West 1982) and IND. CODE ANN. S 34-4-20A-5 (Burns
1986) with Uniform Product Liability Act, supra note 16, at 62,714. See generally Dowokin, supra note
12, at 608.
21. See, e.g.; IND. CODE ANN. 5 34-4-20A-5 (Burns 1986); see also Uniform Product Liability Act,
supra note 16, S 110, at 62,732 (the length of time in which product sellers are subject to liability).
22. 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY S 16 C[21 (1986). Products liability
statutes may contain three types of limitation periods: (1) a statute of limitations; (2) a statute of
repose; (3) or a statute of limitations combined with a statute of repose. See id. A statute of limitation
may run from the date of injury, death, or property damage. Id. A statute of repose may run from the
date of the product's manufacture or sale. Id. A combination of the statutes of limitation and repose
is likely to have one time period of limitation running from the date of death, injury, or property
damage, and a second time limitation running from the date of manufacture or sale. Id.
23. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy, and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30
AM. U. L. REv. 579, 584-85 (1981).
24. Id. at 583.
25. Id. at 584-85.
26. See id. If a state had a six year statute of limitations for the filing-of product liability actions
and a ten year product liability statute of repose that commenced at the date of initial purchase of a
product, a person injured by a defective product eleven years after the date of sale may have no legal
redress even if the claim were brought within the period of the six year statute of limitations. See id. at
585; see also N.D. CENT. CODE 5 28-01.1-02(1) (Supp. 1985) (North Dakota product liability statute
of repose). For the text of 5 28-01.1-02(1) of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 8'.
27. McGovern, supra note 23, at 585.
28. Products Liability Act, ch. 368, S 3, 1979 N.D. Laws 892. The North Dakota Product
Liability Act is a modified version of the Utah Products Liability Act of 1977. Compare N.D. CENT.
CODE ch. 28-01.1 (Supp. 1985) with UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 78-15 (1953); see also Kraft, The North
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purpose of the Act is to alleviate the adverse effects of the increasing
number of lawsuits against manufacturers of defective products.
29
The Act contains a statute of repose, which is codified in section 28-
01.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code.30 The North Dakota
Legislature intended the statute of repose to provide a reasonable
time within which actions may be brought against manufacturers. 31
Proponents of the North Dakota Product Liability Act statute
of repose noted that the cost of product liability insurance had
become unaffordable to many North Dakota manufacturers and
that the statute of repose was essential to reduce insurance costs.
2
Dakota Equity for Tortfeasors Struggle -Judicial Action vs. Legislature Over-Reaction, 56 N.D.L. REv. 67,
99-100 (1980) (noting that North Dakota's Product Liability Act is a slightly modified version of
Utah's Product Liability Act).
The Utah Supreme Court has recently declared the Utah Product Liability Act's statute of
repose unconstitutional. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 686 (Utah 1985). The'
statute of repose violated the Utah Constitution's open court and wrongful death provisions. Id. at
683-85. The court determined that Utah's open court provision required an injured person to have
an effective and reasonable alternative remedy equal to the remedy abrogated by the statute of
repose. Id. at 680. The legislature's elimination of a plaintiff's right of action must not be arbitrary or
unreasonable. See id. The court also reasoned that the Utah Constitution created a wrongful death
action that cannot be legislatively defeated based on how soon the death occurs after the date of
manufacturing or sale of a product. Id. at 685; see UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 78-15 (1953) (Utah Product
Liability Act).
The North Dakota Product Liability Act provides an exception that is unavailable in the Utah
Product Liability Act. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE ch.. 28-01.1 (Supp. 1985) (North Dakota Product
Liability Act) with UTAH CODE ANN. ch. 78-15 (1953) (Utah Product Liability Act). Subsection 28-
01.1-02(3) of the North Dakota Century Code, frequently termed the "safety valve" exception,
provides for the suspension of the ten year statute of limitations if the manufacturer recalls, modifies,
or is aware of a product defect and fails to notify a user who is subsequently injured. See N.D. CENT.
CODE S 28-01.1-02(3) (Supp. 1985). This "safety valve" exception mitigates the harsh effects of the
statute of repose. See id.
29. See N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-01 (Supp. 1985). Section 28-01.1-01 of the North Dakota
Century Code declares the legislative findings and intent of North Dakota's Product Liability Act.
See id. Section 28-01.1-01 of the North Dakota Century Code provides:
1. The legislative assembly finds that the number of lawsuits and claims for damages
and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from defective products has
substantially increased in recent years. Because of these increases, the insurance
industry has drastically increased the cost of products liability insurance. The
effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims has increased product
cost through manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers passing the cost of
premiums to the consumer. Certain product manufacturers are discouraged from
continuing to provide and manufacture certain products because of the high cost
and possible unavailability of products liability insurance.
2. Because of these recent trends, and for the purpose of alleviating the adverse effects
which these trends are producing in the manufacturing industry, it is necessary to
protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private
insurance companies to continue to provide products liability insurance.
3. It is the purpose of sections 28-01.1-01 through 28-01.1-05 to provide a reasonable
time within which actions may be commenced against manufacturers, while
limiting the time to a specific period for which products liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other
procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
Id.
30. Id. 5 28-01.1-02. For the relevant text of S 28-01.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code,
see supra note 8.
31. See id.
32. See NORTH DAKOTA LEOISLATIVE COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE. FoRTY-SIXTH LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY, 137, 138, 140 (1979) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT]; see also Dickson, The
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The proponents claimed that the statute of repose provided the
certainty needed to accurately rate insurance premiums because it
limited manufacturers' open ended liability. 33 Critics of the Act's
statute of repose questioned its constitutionality, however, arguing
that it unfairly limited the compensation available to injured
victims.
34
Injured parties have challenged the constitutional validity of
statutes of repose on a number of occasions. 35 These challenges
have been based on the state and federal constitutional guarantees
of due process, equal protection, and access to the courts.
36
A person may challenge a statute of repose on the grounds that
the denial of, or encroachment upon, an individual's right to sue
violates due process guarantees. 37 The due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law .... ",36 Most courts apply a
"rational basis standard" when evaluating whether a statute of
repose comports with due process guarantees. 39 Courts will uphold
Statute of Limitations in North Dakota's Products Liability Act: An Exercise in Futility?, 59 N.D.L. REV. 5511
(1983) (recitation of the legislative enactment and procedural and substantive effects of the Act).
33. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 32, at 140. Proponents of statutes of repose
contend that the long period of potential liability is the most significant factor in the product liability
problem. McGovern, supra note 23, at 593. Manufacturers contend that other benefits of the statute
of repose include the elimination of stale evidence from "old" claims, and .judicial economy. See
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT supra note 32, at 140; McGovern, supra note 23, at 593-94.
Manufacturers also urge that the benefits of the statute of repose outweigh the potential plaintiffs'
losses, because estimates indicate that the limitation would eliminate only one to three percent of all
product liability actions. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note'32, at 140.
34. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 32, at 139. A North Dakota Attorney General's
opinion suggested that possible constitutional defects existed because the North Dakota Product
Liability Act statute of repose extinguished an existing remedy. Id. at 140. The opinion, however,
added that the comparable medical malpractice statute of repose had not yet been considered by the
North Dakota Supreme Court. Id.
35. See, e.g., Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725-26, 425 N.E.2d 522, 524-25
(1981) (statute of repose did not violate due process under the rational basis standard); Davis v.
Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541, -, 674 P.2d 1194, 1196 (statute of repose did not violate due
process, equal protection, or access to courts provisions), cert. denied, 297 Or. 83, 679 P.2d 1367
(1984). See generally McGovern, supra note 23 (an in depth study of various product liability statutes of
repose before 1981); Hicks, The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose. Federalism Reigns, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 627 (1985) (a study of various statutes of repose).
36. See Hicks, supra note 35, at 635.
37. See, e.g., Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 726, 425 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1981)
(statute of repose did not violate due process under the rational basis standard). See generally
McGovern, supra note 23, at 613 (discussing the due process argument against a product liability
statute of repose).
38. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, S 1. The North Dakota due process clause provides that: "No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
N.D. Const. art. I, § 12. State courts usually follow the federal guidelines in due process cases,
regardless of whether the state court is applying a state or federal constitutional provision. Hicks,
supra note 35, at 642.
39. See, e.g., Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 827 (Colo. 1982) (court applied the
rational basis standard and determined that the statute of repose did not violate due process or equal
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a statute of repose if it is rationally related to a permissive legislative
objective or if the statute does not arbitrarily terminate a plaintiff's
claim.
4 0
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Thornton v. Mono Manufacturing
Co. ,4 applied a rational basis standard of review to a due process
challenge against Illinois' product liability statute of repose. 42 The
plaintiff in Thornton was a minor who was injured when he stepped
on a rotary cutter. 43 The rotary cutter had been purchased more
than ten years before the filing of the complaint.4 4 The court ruled
that the minor's claim was barred by the Illinois statute of repose,
which allowed an injured person's strict liability claim only if the
complaint was filed wihtin ten years of the product's purchase.
45
The plaintiff contended that the statute of repose arbitrarily limited
strict liability claims, but not negligence or breach of warranty
claims. 46 The court reasoned that, because strict liability possesses
different characteristics than the doctrines of negligence or breach
of warranty, a rational legislative purpose may have been served by
the limitation. 47  Thus, the court found that a reasonable
relationship existed between the statute of repose and its intended
purpose.
4 8
protection); Thorton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 726, 425 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1981)
(statute of repose did not violate due process under the rational basis standard). See generally Hicks,
supra note 35, at 635. The rational basis standard of review is the lowest level of scrutiny a court may
apply and is considered so deferential that few statutes fail the test. See id. at 643.
40. See, e.g., Thorton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 725, 425 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1981)
("[w]hether a statute violates the due process clause depends upon whether it bears a reasonable
relationship to a constitutionally permissible purpose"); Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or. App. 541,
__ 674 P.2d 1194, 1196 (statute of repose constitutional if it is rationally related to legislative
purpose), cert. denied, 297 Or. 883, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984). Although some courts have found that
statutes of repose violate due process, no court has invalidated a statute of repose solely on due
process grounds when applying the rational basis standard. Hicks, supra note 35, at 643.
41. 99 111. App. 3d 722, 425 N.E.2d 522 (1981).
42. Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Il. App. 3d 722, 725, 425 N.E.2d 522, 524 (1981). In
Thornton the court stated that the Illinois Legislature enacted the Illinois product liability statute of
repose to alleviate the effect of escalating insurance rates. Id. Manufacturers' rising insurance costs
resulted from the increased exposure to lawsuits since the advent of product liability claims based on
strict liability in tort. Id.
43. Id. at 724, 425 N.E.2d at 523.
44. Id. at 724, 425 N.E.2d at 524.
45. Id. The Illinois statute of repose stated that no product liability action based on strict liability
in tort could be brought after ten years from the date.of sale to its initial user. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
83, para 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd 1979) (repealed 1982).
46. 99 111. App. 3d at 725, 425 N.E.2d at 524. The plaintiff contended that the Illinois statute of
repose violated the guarantee of due process because it had the effect of barring a right of action
before it accrued. Id. at 726, 425 N.E.2d at 525. The court noted that the Illinois Legislature was at
liberty to create or abolish rights as long as no vested rights were disturbed. Id. at 727, 425 N.E.2d at
525. The court reasoned that the plaintiff merely had an expectation of recovery based on an
anticipation of the continuance of existing law and not a vested right because the statute came into
effect before the plaintiff's accident occurred. Id. Thus, because the statute of repose did not disturb
a vested legal right of the plaintiff's, there was no due process violation. Id.
47. Id. at 725, 425 N.E.2d at 524-25.
48. Id. at 726, 425 N.E.2d at 525. The court noted that whether the statute of repose is the best
means to achieve a legislative goal is not a properjudicial inquiry. Id. at 725-26, 425 N.E.2d at 525.
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Plaintiffs have also challenged the constitutionality of statutes
of repose on the grounds that the statutes violate the "open courts"
provisions contained in most state constitutions. 49 Although "open
courts" provisions vary in form from state to state, these clauses
generally guarantee that the courts will be open, without denial or
delay, to every person for the redress of an injury.50 Many courts
have concluded that the applicable statute of repose does not violate
the open courts provision.5 1 A few courts, however, have concluded
that the applicable statute of repose does violate an individual's
guaranteed access to the courts.
52
The Alabama Supreme Court, in Lankford v. Sullivan, Long &
Hagerty,53 applied Alabama's open courts provision to the Alabama
Product Liability Act's statute of repose. 54 The plaintiffs were
Thus, the court concluded that the statute did bear a reasonable relationship to its intended purpose
and therefore did not violate the plaintiff's due process guarantee. See id.
49. See, e.g., Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, 418 N.E.2d 207, 213 (1981) (court
stated that Indiana's statute of repose had a strong presumption of validity and upheld the statute
despite Indiana's open courts clause). See generlly McGovern, supra note 23, at 615 (discussing the
argument that a statute of repose violates the "open courts" provision contained in state
constitutions). The open court analysis often parallels due process analysis because under both
inquiries courts often look for a reasonable relationship between the statute and a legitimate
legislative purpose. Hicks, supra note 35, at 645.
50. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12. Some states have labeled the open
courts provision as "access to courts and remedy" provisions. Hicks, supra note 35, at 644. The
North Dakota open courts provision provides:
All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy by due process of law, and right and justice
administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state in
such manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by
law, direct.
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9. The North Dakota Supreme Court recently interpreted the open courts
provision of the North Dakota Constitution. See Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1986).
In Andrews the plaintiff argued that the open courts provision provided a guarantee of justice.
Id. at 723. The court stated, however, that the open courts provision is guarantee of access to
justice but not an absolute guarantee of justice. See id. The court determined that the open courts
provision may be employed to "prevent the destruction of the only opportunity for an appropriate
remedy." Id.
51. See, e.g., Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 275 Ind. 520, __ 418 N.E.2d 207, 213 (1981)
(Indiana's statute of repose did not violate the state's open courts clause); Davis v. Whiting Corp.,
66 Or. App. 541, -, 674 P.2d 1194, 1196 (statute of repose did not violate access to the courts
provision), cert. denied, 297 Or. 82, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984).
52. See, e.g., Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'ns., 349 N.W.2d 419, 425-27 (S.D.
1984) (court reasoned that greater protection could be provided under the state constitution than
under the Federal Constitution, and concluded that the statute of repose relating to claims against
architects violated the open courts provision); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195,
198 (R. I. 1984) (court determined that the open courts provision barred the legislature from denying
the plaintiff's rights by enacting a statute of repose); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So.
2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982) (statute of repose violated the open courts provision). Courts applying the
open courts provision state that if a statute provides an absolute denial of access to courts before a
claim even arises, the statute is invalid because the bar to redress is antithetical to the purpose of the
access to courts provision. Hicks, supra note 35, at 647.
53. 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982).
54. Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 999 (Ala. 1982); see ALA. CONST.
art. I, S 13 (1975) (Alabama's open courts provision).
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injured when a manlift upon which they were riding collapsed.
55
They alleged that the collapse was due to the negligent design,
manufacture, installation, and inspection of the manlift. 56 The
manlift had been installed fifteen years earlier. 57 The Alabama
statute of repose barred a product liability claim not filed within ten
years of the first use of the product. 58 Thus, the statute of repose
barred the plaintiffs' claim.5 9 The plaintiffs, however, alleged that
the statute violated their right to a remedy under Alabama's open
courts provision. 60 The Alabama Legislature enacted the statute of
repose to provide a limited time frame for the commencement of
product liability actions. 61 The legislature reasoned that, by
limiting product liability actions, the evils caused by litigation
would be reduced.6 2 Applying the rational basis standard of review
to the statute of repose, the court concluded that there was not a
substantial relationship between the statute of repose and its
intended purpose. 63 The court concluded that the statute of repose
was arbitrary on its face and violated the state's open court
provision.64
Finally, a person may challenge the constitutionality of a
statute of repose on the grounds that it violates an individual's right
55. 416 So. 2d at 998.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 999.
58. Id.; seeALA. CODE 5 6-5-502 (Supp. 1986).
59. See 416 So. 2d at 999. The Alabama Supreme Court recognized that legislation that
abolishes a common-law right of action is suspect. Id. at 1000. The court determined that the strict
scrutiny standard of review was applicable because the legislation affected a common-law right of
action. Id. The court noted that a legislatively created right of action required judicial deference as
long as the legislation is not arbitrary. Id. Thus, the court implied that a legislatively created right
of action is in herently less important than one created by the courts. See id. at 1000-01.
60. Id. at 999; see ALA. CONST. art I, S 13 (1975) (Alabama's open courts provision). The
court noted that Alabama's statute of repose absolutely barred an action by a purchaser -who was
injured by a defective product ten years and one month after the first use of the product, while it
allowed a purchaser to sue for injures sustained nine years and eleven months after the first use. 416
So. 2d at 1003. The court contrasted the harshness of Alabama's statute of repose with that of the
Model Uniform Product Liability Act. Id. For a discussion of the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, see Uniform Model Product Liability Act, supra note 16. The Model Act creaties a presumption
that the harm was caused after the expiration of the useful safe life of the product in claims made after
ten years from the time of delivery. Id. § 1 0(B)(1), at 62,734. Alabama's statute of repose has a
harsher effect because it creates an absolute cut off date rather than a rebuttable presumption.
Compare AlA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1986) (Alabama Products Liability Act statute of repose) with
Uniform Model Product Liability Act, supra note 16, 5 110(B)(1), at 62,734.
61. See Lankford, 416 So. 2d at 1001.
62. Id. The court noted that the Alabama Legislature determined that product liability litigation
increased consumer prices, product liability insurance costs, and reduced the availability of product
liability insurance. See id.
63. Id. at 1003. The Alabama Supreme Court recognized that the Alabama Product Liability
Act statute of repose was intended to alleviate the effects of the product liability insurance crisis. Id.
at 1001-03. The court, however, determined that even though there was evidence of a national
insurance crisis, this evidence did not justify the statute of repose. Id. at 1002. The court found no
indication that the statute of repose was a solution to the product liability problem and thus found an
insufficient relationship existed between the statute and its intended purpose. Id. at 1003.
64. Id. at 1004; see also Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984)
(court determined that the open courts provision barred the legislature from denying the plaintiff's
rights).
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to equal protection of laws by creating arbitrary and unreasonable
distinctions between classes of plaintiffs. 65 For example, a statute of
repose may arbitrarily allow a product liability claim if the claim is
made within eleven years of the product's manufacture. 66 The
same statute, however, could bar any claim made after eleven
years. 67
Courts have applied the equal protection clause of both state
and federal constitutions to invalidate statutes of repose. 68 One of
three separate levels of scrutiny may be applied by the courts. 69
Many courts apply the rational basis standard of review. 70 Under a
rational basis standard, courts will uphold the legislation if the
statutory classification is reasonably related to a legitimate
legislative objective. 71 However, if a statute creates a classification
that is "inherently suspect" or encroaches upon an individual's
fundamental rights, the courts will apply a strict scrutiny standard
of review. 72 To survive strict scrutiny analysis, the statute must
promote a compelling governmental purpose and be necessary to
65. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, -, 464 A.2d 288, 294 (1983)
(court held the statute of repose invalid as a denial of equal protection of the laws,. Courts applying
an equal protection analysis often focus on the validity and reasonableness of the classifications, the
uniformity of treatment within the classifications, and the relationship between the classifications
and the purpose of the legislation. McGovern, supra note 23, at 606 n. 148.
66. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1985). For the text of § 28-01.1-02, see supra
note 8.
67. See, e.g., id.
68. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, -, 464 A.2d 288, 296 (1983)
(statute of repose violates state constitution). For a discussion of Heath, see infra notes 76-87 and
accompanying text. See generally McGovern, supra note 23, at 606 (discussing the application of state
and federal equal protection provisions to statutes of repose).
69. McGovern, supra note 23 at 607. A court may apply the strict scrutiny standard of review,
an intermediate level of review, or the rational basis test to a product liability statute of repose. Id.
For a discussion of the rational basis of review, see infra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review, see infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of the intermediate standard of review, see infra notes 74-87 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 825, (Colo. 1983) (statute of repose
did not violate due process or equal protection under the rational basis test); Klien v. Catalano, 386
Mass. 701, , 437 N.E.2d 514, 519-25 (1982) (statute of repose protecting architect's work was
upheld under a rational basis test); Lamb v. Wedgwood South Corp., 308 N.C. 419, __, 302
S.E.2d 868, 879 (1983) (same); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, -, 293 A.2d
662, 668 (1972) (under the rational basis analysis, statute of repose did not violate equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution).
71. See, e.g., Klien v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, -, 437 N.E.2d 514, 519-25 (1982) (statute of
repose protecting architect's work was upheld under a rational basis test); Lamb v. Wedgwood South
Corp., 308 N.C. 419, -, 302 S.E.2d 868, 879 (1983) (same); Davis v. Whiting Corp., 66 Or.
App. 541, -, 674 P.2d 1194, 1196 (the court found the rational basis test applicable and
determined that the statute of repose did not violate due process, equal protection, or access to the
courts provision), cert. denied, 297 Or. 82, 679 P.2d 1367 (1984). McGovern asserts that the
"reasonableness" aspect of the rational basis standard depends on the facts of any given case and
that there is considerable flexibility in its application. McGovern, supra note 23, at 607. Mere
inequity of treatment usually will not render a classification unconstitutional. Id.
72. Dickson, supra note 32, at 566. The courts have not applied the strict scrutiny analysis to a
product liability statute of repose. McGovern, supra note 23, at 607.
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achieve that legislative purpose. 73 Lastly, the court may employ an
intermediate level of scrutiny. 74 Under the intermediate standard,
a statutory classification is constitutional only if a close
correspondence exists between the classification and the legislative
goals. 15
The New Hampshire Supreme Court applied an intermediate
standard of review to an equal protection challenge of a product
liability statute of repose in Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 76 The
plaintiffs alleged that the statute arbitrarily denied a class of
plaintiffs injured by a defective product the right to sue a
manufacturer. 77 The New Hampshire statute prohibited product
liability claims against a manufacturer twelve years after the
manufacturer sold or parted with control of the injury causing
product, regardless of when the injury occurred. 78 A plaintiff,
however, could recover for personal injuries not caused by a
defective product if the action was started within six years of the
injury, provided the injury occurred within twelve years from the
time the manufacturer sold or parted with the product. 
79
The court recognized that, although the right to recover for
personal injuries is not a fundamental right, it is an important
substantive right. 80 Thus, the court applied an intermediate
standard of review. 81 Under the intermediate standard of review,
the court required that the classifications be reasonably and
substantially related to the legislative objective.
82
The court stated that the New Hampshire Legislature enacted
the product liability statute of repose to ameliorate the product
73. Dickson, supra note 32, at 559. Strict scrutiny is the most exacting standard of review in
equal protection analysis. Id. A court will rarely find a statute of repose constitutional under the strict
scrutiny standard of review. Id.
74. See generally id. For an example of the intermediate level of scrutiny applied to a statute of
repose, see infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
75. See generally id. For an example of the intermediate level of scrutiny applied to a statute of
repose, see infra notes 76-86 and accompany text. The court will independently examine the
legislative justification for the statute of repose under the intermediate level of scrutiny to determine
if there is a close correspondence between the statutory classification and the legislative goals of the
statute. Id. at 567.
76. 123 N.H. 512, -_, 464 A.2d 288, 295 (1983).
77. See Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, __, 464 A.2d 288, 295 (1983); see
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 507-D:2, 1I (a) (1983) (statute of repose for product liability claim). The
court noted that although the New Hampshire Legislature could constitutionally establish a statute
of limitations for all personal injury actions if it so desired, it could not discriminate against one class
of plaintiffs in order to limit manufacturers' liability. 123 N.H. at -, 464 A.2d at 296.
78. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 507-D:2, 11 (a) (1983).
79. See id. S 507-D:2 11 (a), (c).
80. 123 N.H. at -, 464 A.2d at 294 (citing Carson V. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931-32, 424
A.2d 825, 830 (1980)).
81. Id. at -, 464 A.2d at 295.
82. Id. For a discussion of the intermediate standard of review, see supra notes 74-75 and
accompanying text.
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liability insurance crisis. 83 The court, however, noted that the New
Hampshire statute had little or no effect on national insurance
rates. 84 .Thus, the court. determined that the statute of repose was
not substantially related to its purpose and arbitrarily discriminated
against one class of plaintiffs. 85 The court, therefore, concluded
that the New Hampshire product liability statute of repose denied
the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws. 8 6
The North Dakota Supreme Court examined the
constitutionality of North Dakota's Product Liability Act's statute
of repose in Hanson v. Williams County.8 7 Hanson based her
constitutional challenge of the North Dakota Product Liability Act
on the North Dakota Constitution, which guarantees access to the
courts, 88  equal protection,89  and due process. 90  The court,
however, based its decision solely on the equal protection
provision. 91 The court stated that an injury caused by a defective
product involves the important substantive right of human life and
safety. 92 The court, therefore, applied an intermediate standard of
review in its equal protection analysis. 93 The court noted that the
83. See id. at __, 464 A.2d at 293, 296.
84. Id. at __ , 464 A.2d at 294. The court noted that a New Hampshire Legislative Committee
concluded that it was unlikely that the enactment of the New Hampshire Product Liability Act would
alleviate the product liability problem. Id.
85. See id. at __ , 464 A.2d at 295. One commentator suggests that had the New Hampshire
Supreme Court applied the rational basis test in Heath, the court could have upheld the statute
because of the deference given to the legislature under the rational basis test. Hicks, supra note 35, at
641. For a discussion of the rational basis standard of reivew, see supra note 71 and accompanying
text.
86. 123 N.H. at __,464 A.2d at296-97.
87. 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D. 1986).
88. Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319, 322-23 (N.D. 1986); see N.D. CONST. art. 1,
S 9 (open courts provision). For the text of article I, S 9 of the North Dakota Constitution, see supra
note 50.
89. 389 N.W.2d 322-23; see N.D. CoNsT. art. 1, , 21 (equal protection provision). For the text of
article I, S 21 of the North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 11.
90. 389 N.W.2d 322-23; see N.D. CoNsT. art. I, S 12 (due process provision). For the text of
article I, 5 12 of the North Dakota Constitution, see supra note 38. Hanson did not specifically
identify the state constitutional provisions on equal protection and due process in her challenge. 389
N.W.2d 319, 323 n.8. However, the court noted that Hanson referred primarily to the North Dakota
Constitution and North Dakota caselaw to support her arguments. Id. Therefore, the court analyzed
Hanson's challenges in terms of the North Dakota Constitution and North Dakota caselaw. See id. at
323-28.
91. 389 N.W.2d at 328.
92. Id. at 325. Chief.Justice Erikstad dissented from the majority opinion in Hanson. See id. at
330 (Erikstad, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice stated that, since Hanson's right of action was an
economic right, the rational basis standard of review should be applied to the statute of repose. Id. at
336. For a discussion of the rational basis standard, see supra note 71 and accompanying text. Chief
Justice Erikstad indicated, however, that he would uphold the legislation under either the rational
basis or the intermediate test. See id. at 343. He explained that the legislature often must act with a
sparsity of facts and should not be prevented from reasonable experimentation. Id. at 345-46. The
Chief.Justice stated that the approach adopted by the majority was erroneous, stating "Iilt is not the
function of the Court to second-guess the accuracy of a legislative determination of fact." Id. at 343.
93. Id. at 352. Hanson argued that the court should apply the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Id. at 323 n.9. The court, however, concluded that the right to recover for personal injuries
is an important substantive right, but that it is not similar to fundamental rights that require
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intermediate standard of review requires a close correspondence
between the statutory classification and the legislative goals.
94
The court recognized that the classification made by the North
Dakota Product Liability Act's statute of repose barred the claim of
a person who was injured by a product that was initially purchased
more than ten years before, or manufactured eleven years before
the injury. 95 A person injured by a product that was purchased less
than ten years before, or manufactured less than eleven years
before the injury, however, could bring an action against the
manufacturer. 96 The court then applied the intermediate level of
review to the issue of "whether or not there is a close
correspondence between [the] statutory classification and the
legislative goals [that] would justify this classification." 97
The court recognized that the statute of repose served an
important governmental interest in alleviating the insurance
problem faced by manufacturers. 98 However, the court required
more than economic interests to justify the arbitrary denial of
important substantive rights. 99 The court suggested a less arbitrary
means of achieving the legislative goals. t00 The court stated that in
"claims that involved harm caused more than ten years after time
of delivery, a presumption should arise that the harm was caused
after the useful safe life [of the product] had expired."' 10 1 The court
strict scrutiny. See id. Thus, the court applied the intermediate level of review rather than strict
scrutiny. See id. For a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review, see supra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text.
Ingram, the manufacturer of the earth packer, urged the court to apply the rational basis
standard of review. Id. at 323 n.10. The rational basis test is applied to a statute that pertains to
economic regulation. Id. at 325. The court rejected the rational basis standard reasoning that human
life and safety should not be viewed as a matter of economics. Id. Traditionally, a strong
presumption of constitutionality attaches to a statute pertaining to economic matters and thus, a
court gives deference to the legislative action. McGovern, supra note 23, at 607. For a discussion of
the rational basis standard of review, see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
94. 389 N.W.2d at 323.
95. Id. at 326-27; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1985). For the text of 5 28-01.1-02
of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 8.
96. 389 N.W.2d at 326-27; see N.D. CENT. CODE S 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1985). For the text of S 28-
01. 1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, see supra note 8.
97. 389 N.W.2d at 327.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 328. The court recognized the North Dakota Legislature's attempt to reduce the costs
of insurance to manufacturers; however, it questioned whether the statute of repose was the proper
solution. Id. The court was concerned about the important substantive rights of life and safety that
the statute of repose allowed one class of persons, but arbitrarily denied to another class of persons.
Id. The court was unwilling to consider human life and safety as merely a matter of economics and
resolved to focus on the individuals affected by the statute of repose. Id. at 325.
100. Id. at 328. The court noted that the Uniform Model Product Liability Act provided a less
arbitrary means of reaching the legislative goals. Id.; see UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, supra note
16, S 1I0(B) (1), at 62,734.
101. 389 N.W.2d at 328. The court recognized that the Uniform Product Liability Act merely
creates a presumption that the harm was caused after the safe useful life of the product had expired.
Id.; see UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, supra note 16, 5 1 0(B)(1), at 62,734. The Uniform
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reasoned that this presumption would not provide an absolute cut
off date for products liability claims, and therefore would be a less
arbitrary means of reaching the legislative goals.'0 2 The court
determined that the correspondence between the classification
created by the statute of repose and the legislative goals was not
sufficient to justify the arbitrary denial of a right of action of one
class of plaintiffs. 10 3 Thus, the court concluded that the statute of
repose violated the equal protection provision of the North Dakota
Constitution. 
104
Prior to the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in
Hanson, the North Dakota Product Liability Act statute of repose
could bar a right of action before it accrued.10 5 The statute of repose
shifted the risk of loss from the product manufacturer to the
consumer. 10 6 The decision in Hanson reallocates the risk of loss to
the manufacturers, who again must take responsibility for older
products. 10 7 The number of claims made against manufacturers
may increase, but it is unlikely that there will be a substantial
increase. 0 Furthermore, despite the elimination of the North
Dakota statute of repose, it is unlikely that product liability
insurance rates will increase because premiums are determined on
a nationwide basis rather than on state policy. 109
The North Dakota Product Liability Act's statute of repose
placed the decision of who may recover for an injury into the hands
of the legislature and thus, victim compensation decisions shifted
from the judicial system to the legislature. 0 The elimination of the
statute of repose will redirect compensation decisions into the
Product Liability Act does not provide for an absolute cut off date and thus does not produce the
harsh effect of most state statutes of repose. See id.
102. See389 N.W.2d at 328.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court reversed the district court decision and remandeded the case for trial. Id.
105. See N.D. CENT. CoDE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1985).
106. See id.; McGovern, supra note 23, at 592. The statute of repose forced the consumer to bear
the risk of loss by eliminating recovery for injury after a specific period of time. See N.D. CENT. CODE
S 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1985).
107. See Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 328; McGovern, supra note 23, at 598 (discussing industry's
incentive to make safe products when not protected by a statute of repose).
108. See Uniform Product Liability Act, Analysis, supra note 16, 5 110, at 62,733 (citing
Insurance Services Office (ISO) "Closed Claim Survey" at 105-08). One survey estimates that
ninety-seven percent of product caused accidents occur within six years from the time the product
was purchased and approximately eighty-three percent of all bodily injury accidents occur within ten
years of the product's manufacture. Id. But see Kraft, supra note 28, at 102 n.125 (noting that these
statistics are at best an educated guess).
109. See Model Uniform Products Liability Act, supra note 16, S 101 (D), at 62,716. Nationwide
statistics are used to determine product liability insurance rates because a product produced in one
state can readily cause injury in another state. Id.
110. See McGovern, supra note 23, at 592-93 (noting that the effect of a statute of repose is to shift
decision making regarding compensation from the courts to the legislature).
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judicial system."'. Without the arbitrary classification barring a
claim, an injured party will have his or her day in court and will
receive a fair opportunity for compensation.11 2 Manufacturers will
be forced to pay the price for defective products, regardless of the
product's age.113 Thus, the risk of increased claims creates an
economic incentive for manufacturers to produce safe products and
focus on the long term risks involved in the use of their product.
tt 4
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I 11. See id. at 594. Once the plaintiff's recovery decision is placed in the courts, the principles of
liability may be applied in a flexible manner. Id. at 596.
112. Id. at 596-97.
113. See id. at 597-98.
114. Id. at 598. If manufacturers are not held responsible for the safety of their products after the
expiration of an arbitrary period of time, the normal economic incentive for safety and financial
responsibility for older products is reduced. Id.
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